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Abstract 
Efforts to enforce compulsory schooling by linking welfare assistance to school attendance are rarely 
successful in themselves. One reason is a lack of credibility: targeted families may anticipate that 
welfare administrators will be reluctant to withdraw support when attendance does not improve. 
Australia's School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) 
demonstrates the impact of a credible threat. Targeting the Indigenous population of the Northern 
Territory, its credibility stemmed from the extreme circumstances created by the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Act and from the troubled history of race relations in Australia. We show, 
using a difference-in-difference analysis of standardized test data (NAPLAN), that SEAM had a 
substantial, immediate impact: in its first year it triggered an increase in test participation rates of 16-
20 percentage points over pre-SEAM levels; and it significantly increased the share of tested cohorts 
achieving national minimum standards by 5-10 percentage points. However, welfare payments were 
rarely withheld from truant families and participation rates fell in subsequent years, though 
remaining significantly above pre-SEAM levels. This suggests that initiatives such as SEAM will not 
be fully effective in the longer term unless accompanied by measures that increase parents’ and 
children’s appreciation of the value of schooling. 
 
JEL classification: I25, I38 
Keywords: Australia, Indigenous population, Northern Territory Emergency Response, SEAM, 
compulsory schooling, linking school attendance to welfare payments 
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1. Introduction 
All advanced, industrialized countries have compulsory schooling laws with high levels of 
compliance; non-compliance is generally limited to a small fraction of families, many of them living 
in deprivation. Making sure these children attend school regularly is a key element in breaking the 
intergenerational chain of poverty, yet full enforcement often proves difficult. Options for 
intervention are limited: removing truant children from their families is an extreme measure that 
cannot be implemented except in special cases; and providing parents with positive inducements to 
send their children to school, such as the conditional cash transfers (CCT) now offered in some 
developing countries (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005) are expensive and unpopular in developed 
countries inasmuch as they reward parents of truant children for complying with the law.1  
One policy approach implemented in the United States in a number of settings involves linking 
welfare payments to school attendance, on the assumption that the threat of withholding payments 
will be sufficient to deter truancy. Reviewing such programs, Campbell and Wright (2005), conclude 
that unless accompanied by case management resources, they do not significantly improve 
attendance. In many instances, caseworkers find valid reasons for non-compliance; in others, 
targeted families were unaware of the threat of withholding welfare payments. In general, welfare 
administrators appreciate that withholding payments will harm the very children they are trying to 
help and resist following through, and targeted families, realizing this, do not respond. This raises 
the question, whether more credible threats might achieve different results. 
Australia's School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) provides 
a unique opportunity to answer this question. SEAM threatened to withhold welfare payments from 
Indigenous parents in the Northern Territory whose children failed to meet school attendance 
requirements. It was implemented against the backdrop of the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response (NTER), an intervention directed at the Northern Territory's Indigenous population in 
response to allegations of child sex abuse in their communities, which involved a military presence 
and temporary suspension of Australia's Racial Discrimination Act (Broome, 2010).2 While formally 
separate from the NTER, SEAM gained credibility from the heightened anxiety generated by the 
NTER, which was further reinforced by the living memory of yet severer, purportedly well-meaning 
 
1 Field experiments offering positive incentives for educational outcomes to disadvantaged students indicate that they can 
be effective (Levitt et al., 2012; Cook et al., 2014).  
2 The military component of the NTER was called “Operation Outreach.”  
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measures to which Indigenous Australians had been subjected by Australian governments in the 
past.3  
In this paper we estimate SEAM's impact on school attendance and learning achievement among 
the population of Indigenous children in the Northern Territory. To this purpose we apply a 
difference-in-difference analysis to data from the National Assessment Program—Language Arts 
and Numeracy (NAPLAN) on participation rates and test score averages in reading and numeracy, in 
grades 3, 5, 7 and 9, comparing the difference between Indigenous participation and performance in 
the Northern Territory and Indigenous participation and performance across Australia's states and 
territories, between 2008, the year before SEAM was implemented, and subsequent years to 2012.4 
Previewing our main results, we find that in 2009, the first year in which SEAM was implemented, 
test participation increased dramatically among Indigenous children in the Northern Territory, by 16-
20 percentage points compared to pre-SEAM levels (in 2008) of about 70%, where no similar 
increase was witnessed among the Indigenous populations of Australia’s other states and territories. 
Surprisingly, this sharp rise in participation rates did not lower test means, suggesting that the 
academic ability of those induced to sit the test by SEAM was similar, on average, to that of students 
who would have taken the test absent intervention. Consequently, in 2009 the share of each cohort 
achieving the minimum standard on these tests increased substantially, by 5 to 10 percentage points 
over its 2008 level of about 30%, where again no similar increase was witnessed among the 
Indigenous populations of other states and territories.  
However, these achievements could not be sustained. The threat of withholding welfare payments 
from the remaining Indigenous parents whose children failed to meet school attendance requirements 
was not carried out except in a handful of cases; and as this was observed and became widely 
known, participation rates fell off. The following year, 2010, saw an erosion of about half the gains 
achieved the year before. By 2012, the last year in our study, participation rates had fallen 
substantially from their peak in 2009 but remained significantly above the baseline levels of 2008. 
However, nearly all the gains in the share of the cohort achieving minimum standard evaporated.  
These findings demonstrate that a credible threat to link welfare payments to school attendance 
can substantially raise participation rates and learning achievement. Yet this increase could not be 
sustained even in the unique circumstances of the NTER, as the threat of withholding welfare 
 
3 The most extreme of these policies was the forced removal of Indigenous children from their families by Australian 
Federal and State government agencies, which continued until as recently as 1969. In 2008, then Australian Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd issued a formal recognition and apology for what has come to be called "The Stolen Generations". 
4 We only had access to publicly available aggregate data. If individual-level data is released it will be possible to carry 
out more detailed analyses that may shed further light on this unique experience.  
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payments proved hollow. Of the parents induced by SEAM to send their children to school in 2009, 
some continued to do so in subsequent years, when they no longer felt threatened, but many did not. 
Presumably, they still did not see the value in conventional schooling—whether due to the 
importance they attached to traditional activities not well served by conventional education,5 or 
because they saw limited opportunities for their children in the Australian labor market.  
This indicates that even when threats to link welfare payments to school attendance are initially 
credible, the gains they achieve are largely temporary. In themselves, they programs offer at best an 
opportunity to demonstrate to parents that sending their children to school is worthwhile on its own 
merits. For them to have an effect in the longer term, parents’ perceptions of the value of schooling 
must be changed.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the Indigenous 
population in the Northern Territory; Section 3 describes the NTER and SEAM initiatives; Section 4 
presents descriptive statistics on the impact of SEAM on education outcomes in the Northern 
Territory; Section 5 presents results of regression analysis of the data; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory 
Indigenous Australians exhibit markedly weaker aggregate indicators of well-being compared to 
non-Indigenous Australians in many important dimensions such as life expectancy, education levels, 
health outcomes, employment, family and community violence, incarceration and freedom from 
poverty (Stephens, 2010; SCRGSP, 2011). The gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians is especially large in the Northern Territory, where a larger share of the Indigenous 
population lives in remote locations, and where they are an overwhelming majority and many 
maintain a traditional way of life.6  
Life expectancy. The most recent estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)7 put the 
life expectancy of Indigenous Australian men at 67 years, twelve years less than the Australian 
 
5 Altman, Buchanan and Biddle (2006) describe the Indigenous economy of the Northern Territory as comprising a 
private sector, a public sector and a non-market customary sector, where the customary sector includes such activities as 
fishing and hunting, art and craft production, and meeting cultural responsibilities. Time spent in school may have a 
negative effect on productivity in the customary sector. We expand on this in Section 2. 
6 Their overall share of the population in the Northern Territory, 27% according to the 2011 census, is by far the highest 
of any Australian state or territory. A larger share of Indigenous Australians live in New South Wales, but they make up 
only 2.5% of its population. Indigenous Australians also own roughly half the land in the Northern Territory. 
7 Life expectancy trends - Australia, Australian Social Trends, March 2011 (ABS cat. no. 4102.0) 
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average, and that of Indigenous Australian women at 73 years, ten years below average. The average 
life expectancy of an Indigenous man or woman in the Northern Territory is about 2 years less than 
the average Indigenous Australian—slightly less than the average life expectancy in Bangladesh.  
Education. Participation in the National Assessment Program for Literacy and Numeracy 
(NAPLAN) in 2008, the year before SEAM was implemented, averaged over 90% for the Australian 
population at large; just under 80% for all Indigenous Australians; and about 70% for the Indigenous 
population of the Northern Territory (slightly more in grades 3 and 5; slightly less in grades 7 and 
9).8 In 2012, more than 1 in 5 Indigenous students in Australia performed below the national 
minimum standard in year 3 numeracy and reading compared to 1 in 30 non-Indigenous Australian 
students. At the same time, almost 60% of year 3 Indigenous students in the Northern Territory 
scored below the national minimum standard on the numeracy and reading component of NAPLAN; 
in grade 9 about 67% failed to meet minimum standards.  
Labor market outcomes. Differences in aggregate labor market outcomes between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians are similarly arresting. Approximately 76% of non-Indigenous 
Australians participate in the labor force, and 72% are employed, while only 57% of Indigenous 
Australians participate in the workforce and only 48% are employed. The labor market participation 
rate for Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory is even lower, 44%, according to the 2011 
Labour Force Survey.9 Nonetheless, the unemployment rate among the Indigenous population of the 
Northern Territory was among the lowest among Indigenous Australians. This was partly due to the 
Community Development Employment Project (CDEP), a work for welfare scheme that was 
especially common in remote areas, where approximately 80% of Indigenous persons in the Northern 
Territory live (Hunter and Gray, 2012).10  
Altman, Buchanan and Biddle (2006) describe Indigenous employment in Australia as divided 
among three sectors: the private or market sector; the public sector (predominately CDEP); and the 
customary or informal sector, which includes activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering, 
production of art and crafts, and land, habitat and species management participation. Employment in 
the customary or informal sector is especially large in remote Indigenous communities, which 
 
8 NAPLAN national reports, http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html. 
9 Labour Force Characteristics of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, Estimates from the Labour Force 
Survey, 2011 (ABS cat. no. 6287.0) 
10 In July 2013 the Australian government replaced CDEP with the Remote Jobs and Communities Program (RJCP). 
While successive policy agendas have aimed to sharply reduce the gap in employment outcomes, one estimate suggests 
that “labour force participation rates would take over a century to converge if the trends for the period 1971-2006 were to 
persist” (Altman, Biddle and Hunter, 2008) 
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account for a disproportionately large fraction of the Indigenous population of the Northern 
Territory. Ignoring employment in this third, non-market sector, as ABS statistics do, effectively 
underestimates the level of employment among the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory. 
Recognizing its importance leads to a more realistic assessment of the opportunity cost of 
conventional schooling and hence to a further downward revision of the already low returns to 
schooling that Indigenous families in remote areas can reasonably anticipate.  
Table 1, drawn from the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey (NATSISS) 
for 2008, illustrates the distinct cultural identity and socio-economic circumstances of Indigenous 
Australians living in the Northern Territory, compared to other large Indigenous populations in 
Western Australia, Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia. Indigenous Australians in 
the Northern Territory have stronger ties to traditional Indigenous culture and ways of life, and are 
less likely to report they or a relative had been forcibly removed from their natural families. In some 
respects—psychological distress, disability, employment rates—they are similar to other Indigenous 
Australians, but Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory have less formal schooling and less 
access to money income, and hence are less socially mobile within Australian society at large. 
TABLE 1—SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION, BY STATE/TERRITORY 
 Northern Territory 
Western 
Australia Queensland 
New South 
Wales 
South 
Australia 
Speak Indigenous language   62.6 22.6 19.1 3.2 25.9 
Identify with tribal group  85.4 62.3 64.2 51.7 72.7 
Live on homelands   40.5 29.5 16.7 29.6 17.9 
Involved in cultural events   81.3 70.0 65.2 55.1 65.0 
Has crisis support   85.2 90.1 84.6 92.0 90.8 
Removed from natural family   4.8 11.0 7.2 7.7 11.9 
Source: National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey (NATSISS), 2008. 
 
 
3. The perception of SEAM within the context of the NTER 
The impact of the School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) 
on education outcomes, on which we focus in this paper, can only be understood against the 
backdrop of the controversial Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) or “Northern 
Territory Intervention” initiated shortly before it, for although SEAM was not part of the NTER, it 
was the operational context of the NTER that lent SEAM much of its initial credibility.  
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The NTER was implemented by the Liberal-National Coalition government under John Howard in 
2007, during the lead-up to the federal election that year. The initial response deployed additional 
police and military units in the Northern Territory,11 as an immediate response to allegations of 
widespread child neglect and sexual abuse in Indigenous communities outlined in the publication of 
Little Children are Sacred (Wild and Anderson, 2007).  
The NTER imposed government control of Indigenous communities for a five-year period and 
introduced a range of measures aimed at addressing the abuse of children and women and narrowing 
the gaps in economic opportunity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. These 
measures included, among others, deployment of additional police and military to affected 
communities, restrictions on alcohol and pornography, reforms that limited Native land rights, added 
Commonwealth funding for community services, and sequestering 50 percent of all welfare 
payments for basic needs—racially targeted measures that required temporary suspension of the 
Racial Discrimination Act (see Broome (2010) for a comprehensive discussion). The Australian 
Defense Force presence ended in 2008 but the Intervention continued until August 2012 through 
various policy initiatives (Altman and Russell, 2012), and has since been replaced by the Stronger 
Futures Policy. The NTER was supported by subsequent Labor governments under both Kevin Rudd 
and Julia Gillard and enjoyed a strong bi-partisan mandate. But many Indigenous leaders spoke out 
publicly against it, labeling it ‘authoritarian’ and ‘paternalistic.’12 
SEAM was seen as a key element in narrowing the economic gap between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians and interrupting the intergenerational transmission of poverty, specifically by 
raising school attendance rates, which were very low among Indigenous Australians in the Northern 
Territory: an average attendance rate of 78% in 2008 compared to a national average of 91% and yet 
larger differences in standardized test (NAPLAN) participation rates. It aimed to achieve this 
purpose by linking income support payments to school attendance.  
 
 
 
11 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) began “Operation Outreach” on 27 June 2007 and deployed approximately 600 
ADF personnel, about 400 of them soldiers (http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/opoutreach/index.htm). This 
manner of intervention in the Northern Territory would not have been constitutionally possible in Australia's states. 
12
 Broome (2010) describes this public response, noting an open letter against the intervention signed by sixty Aboriginal 
community and church organizations, in The Age newspaper. Support for the NTER, was voiced by some Indigenous  
leaders, notably women such as Professor Marcia Langston, who saw it as necessary for protecting the rights of 
Indigenous women and children in view of the failure of the Northern Territory government to address these issues 
effectively. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-02-08/trapped-in-the-aboriginal-reality-show/1036918. 
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TABLE 2—TARGET POPULATIONS IN SEAM SITES, 2009 
Location 
Total 
Population 
Indigenous 
population 
Parents in 
SEAM 
Children in 
SEAM 
Katherine Township 9208 2365 354 611 
Katherine Town Camps - - 111 191 
Hermannsburg 623 537 87 125 
Wallace Rockhole 68 63 15 21 
Tiwi Islands 2579 2267 203 336 
Wadeye 2112 1927 219 374 
Notes: Population statistics come from the 2011 Australian Census and the target numbers come from DEEWR 
(2011). The total population for Katherine Town Camps was not reported in publicly available census data.  
 
Administered by the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 
(FaHCSIA), SEAM was announced in June 2008, and began in January 2009. In its first year, it 
formally targeted a small population of parents receiving Centrelink (welfare) payments with 
children in one of fourteen schools in six trial areas. Table 2 shows the distribution of children and 
parents across the six trial areas targeted by SEAM in 2009, along with population statistics from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Katherine Town Camps is an exclusively Indigenous 
community located near Katherine Township, a regional center in the Northern Territory. Overall, 
989 parents and 1,658 children were deemed within the scope of SEAM in 2009 (DEEWR, 2011), a 
small fraction of the overall Indigenous population of the Northern Territory.  
Government reports published by the Department of Employment, Education and Workplace 
Relations (DEEWR) indicate that high awareness of the SEAM program among parents was 
accompanied by a high level of misinformation about how the program worked and whom it targeted 
(DEEWR, 2011). According to these reports, “parents and communities had limited understanding of 
the details of SEAM, and this was compounded by misinformation”. The report cited several 
common misconceptions among parents and community members that heightened its effectiveness 
not only among its target population but among the entire Indigenous population of the Northern 
Territory:  
 It was directed at Indigenous children in remote areas.  
 All carers (including grandmothers and aunts) would have their payments suspended if 
they were caring for a truant child.  
 All Indigenous families in trial locations were subject to SEAM, including waged 
families and families participating in CDEP.  
 Non-compliance with SEAM would trigger immediate suspension of payments, rather 
than requiring a compliance period as was actually the case.  
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In fact, of the 989 parents deemed within scope of the SEAM program in 2009 none had their 
payments suspended for failure to comply (DEEWR, 2011). The stated policy goal of SEAM was to 
increase enrolments, and 918 parents (1604 children) were sent enrolment notification letters which 
requested they provide their child’s school enrolment details to Centrelink within 14 days. According 
to the DEEWR evaluation report the overall non-compliance rate was 170 parents (286 children). Of 
these, 56 parents (84 children) were sent enrolment warning notices, the final step before having 
their benefits suspended. The majority complied but eleven chose to move out of the scope of the 
program (effectively this was the most severe sanction for non-compliance in 2009). The strong 
threats implicit in the information campaign that accompanied the initial implementation in 2009 
were not carried out. 
 
4. The impact of SEAM on educational outcomes: Descriptive statistics 
While raising school enrollment and attendance rates was the immediate target of SEAM its 
ultimate goal was to have a positive impact on learning achievement. We did not have access to 
individual enrolment or attendance data that would have allowed us to track changes in Indigenous 
attendance rates. However, we are able to estimate the impact of SEAM on learning outcomes from 
NAPLAN participation and achievement data.13 Tables 3 and 4 presents comparative summary 
statistics on NAPLAN outcomes in two knowledge domains, reading and numeracy, averaged over 
four grade levels (3, 5, 7, and 9), in five successive years: from 2008, the year before SEAM was 
implemented to 2012. They illustrate vividly both the immediate impact, in 2009, of the perceived 
threat of SEAM on education outcomes in the Northern Territory, and the abatement of this effect in 
subsequent years as it became increasingly apparent that the threat of withholding welfare payments 
was not being carried out.  
Three indicators are presented in these tables: the participation rate, the share of students in the 
cohort above minimum standard, and the pass rate. The participation rate is defined as the percentage 
of students participating in the NAPLAN test (including students exempted by the school) as a 
percentage of the total number of students in the year level.14 The share of students in the cohort 
 
13 NAPLAN comprises five knowledge domains (numeracy, reading, grammar, spelling and writing). Each year, in mid-
May, the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) administers tests in each domain to all 
Australian students in grades 3, 5, 7, and 9. The data reported here are from the 2008-2012 NAPLAN National Reports 
published by ACARA, and available at http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html. 
14 Non-participating students are students classified as absent or withdrawn (by the parents). 
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above minimum standard is defined for grade level g and knowledge domain d in year t (say, grade 7 
numeracy in 2010) as: 
(1) Sgdt  = (Pgdt –Mgdt) / Tgt   
 
where Pgdt is the number of students in grade g participating in the test in knowledge domain d in 
year t , Mgdt  is the number of students scoring below minimum standard on that test, and Tgt is the 
total number of students in grade g in year t. This is distinct from our third indicator, the pass rate, 
which is the percentage of students participating in the test who scored above minimum standard. It 
is defined as 
   
(2)     Rgdt  =  (Pgdt –Mgdt) / Pgdt  
 
TABLE 3—NAPLAN OUTCOMES IN READING, AVERAGED OVER ALL GRADE LEVELS, % 
 Participation  Above minimum standard Pass rate 
 All 
non-
Indig. 
All 
Indig. 
Indig. 
In NT 
All 
non-
Indig. 
All 
Indig. 
Indig. 
In NT 
All 
non-
Indig. 
All 
Indig. 
Indig. 
In NT 
2008 96 87 67 92 61 22 95 70 33 
2009 96 89 86 92 65 31 96 73 36 
2010 96 87 76 92 64 30 96 73 39 
2011 96 87 77 92 65 30 96 75 39 
2012  95 86 74 91 63 27 96 73 36 
Source: The 2008-2012 NAPLAN National Reports, http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-
reports.html. Entries are averages over the four cohorts in each year: grades 3, 5, 7 and 9. 
 
TABLE 4—NAPLAN OUTCOMES IN NUMERACY, AVERAGED OVER ALL GRADE LEVELS, % 
 Participation  Above minimum standard Pass rate 
 All 
non-
Indig. 
All 
Indig. 
Indig. 
In NT 
All 
non-
Indig. 
All 
Indig. 
Indig. 
In NT 
All 
non-
Indig. 
All 
Indig. 
Indig. 
In NT 
2008 96 86 68 97 66 32 97 77 48 
2009 96 88 85 97 67 38 97 77 45 
2010 95 87 75 97 66 32 97 76 43 
2011 95 86 76 97 68 38 97 79 49 
2012  95 85 72 96 64 30 96 75 43 
Source: The 2008-2012 NAPLAN National Reports, http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-
reports.html. Entries are averages over the four cohorts in each year: grades 3, 5, 7 and 9. 
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The pattern of change in participation rates is similar for both knowledge domains. First, a sharp 
increase in 2009—of 19 percentage points in reading and 17 in numeracy—without parallel for 
Australia as a whole, or for the general Indigenous population. This change nearly erased, in a single 
year, the difference between the participation rates of the Indigenous population in the Northern 
Territory and in the entire Indigenous population of Australia, illustrating the dramatic effect that can 
be achieved by a credible threat to link welfare payments to schooling.  
However, though the threat was initially perceived to be credible it was not actually carried out, 
and as this came to be known it resulted in an immediate falling off in participation rates: ten 
percentage points in each domain in 2010, with smaller declines in subsequent years, leaving 
participation rates in 2012, in reading and numeracy, respectively seven and four percentage points 
above their 2008 pre-SEAM levels.  
Surprisingly, this dramatic immediate rise in participation rates did not trigger commensurate 
declines in pass rates—the share of test takers achieving minimum standard levels—as one might 
expect. The pass rate in reading actually rose by three percentage points, mirroring a similar rise in 
the general Indigenous population, while the pass rate in numeracy fell by the same measure. 
Subsequent years saw yet further gains in reading pass rates and fluctuating changes in numeracy. 
We take this as indicating that those who were not taking NAPLAN tests absent SEAM, but were 
induced to do so by SEAM, had similar academic ability, especially in reading, to students who 
participated in NAPLAN before SEAM was implemented.  
This rise in participation rates without a commensurate decline in pass rates resulted in immediate 
increases in the share of the Indigenous cohort in the Northern Territory achieving minimum 
standard over pre-SEAM 2008 levels: an increase in 2009 of ten percentage points in reading, from 
21% to 31%, and six percentage points in numeracy, from 32% to 38%. These are dramatic increases 
in measured achievement learning, gained in only one year. However, again, we see much of these 
gains eroded in subsequent years. The gain in reading in 2012, of six percentage points over the base 
level, remains substantial, while the share achieving minimum standard in numeracy fluctuates 
strongly, above and below 2008 levels, from year to year. These patterns are illustrated graphically 
for each grade level in Figures 1-4. The underlying data are provided in the appendix. 
Figure 1 shows trends in the percentage of Indigenous students participating in the NAPLAN 
reading test in the Northern Territory, marked by the black line, compared to Indigenous students in 
Australia's other states and territories, marked by gray lines. In 2008, prior to the implementation of 
SEAM, participation in the NAPLAN reading test among Indigenous students in the Northern 
Territory was the lowest in Australia, regardless of year level. The spike in participation in 2009 is 
visually obvious in Figure 1 for all year levels, with the largest increase in grades 5 and 7 and the 
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smallest in grade 9; in 2009, the Northern Territory's Indigenous participation share is no longer the 
lowest of all states and territories in any grade. However, this increase falls off immediately, in 2010, 
in all grades, as a result of which the Northern Territory's Indigenous participation share is again the 
lowest of all states and territories in each grade and each year from 2010 on. Nonetheless, in all 
grade levels, participation rates in NAPLAN reading tests in 2012 are markedly higher than in 2008. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. TRENDS IN NAPLAN READING TEST PARTICIPATION BY STATE/TERRITORY 
Source: NAPLAN National Reports, 2008-12, http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html. 
 
Figure 2 shows trends in the percentage of Indigenous students participating in the NAPLAN 
numeracy test in each grade level and year, again comparing the Northern Territory to other states 
and territories. The same dynamic patterns observed for participation rates in reading tests are again 
apparent here: a sharp rise in 2009 followed by a sharp immediate decline in 2010, and further 
gradual decline in subsequent years to a final level, in 2012, higher than the base level in 2008. 
Again this pattern is unique to the Northern Territory; no other state or territory exhibits a similar 
pattern. 
14 
 
 
FIGURE 2. TRENDS IN NAPLAN NUMERACY TEST PARTICIPATION BY STATE/TERRITORY 
Source: NAPLAN National Reports, 2008-12, http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 present time trends in the percentage of Indigenous students above minimum 
standard, respectively in reading and numeracy, for each grade level, comparing the Northern 
Territory (the black line) to Australia's other states and territories (the gray lines). We find significant 
differences between the two knowledge domains and among grade levels. In reading we find a 
substantial increase of about ten percentage points, from about 20% to about 30%, in grades 3, 5 and 
7, followed by a very mild decline that leaves much of the initial gain intact, while grade 9 shows no 
systematic effect. Trends in numeracy, in Figure 4, are less pronounced with more fluctuation. 
Nonetheless we see here, too, increases in the share reaching minimum standard from 2008 to 2009 
in grades 5, 7 and 9 (the largest increase is in grade 5), followed by a decline in 2010; there is no 
increase for grade 3 
15 
 
 
FIGURE 3. INDIGENOUS STUDENTS ABOVE MINIMUM STANDARD IN READING BY STATE/TERRITORY 
Source: NAPLAN National Reports, 2008-12, http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html. 
 
FIGURE 4. : INDIGENOUS STUDENTS ABOVE MINIMUM STANDARD IN NUMERACY BY STATE/TERRITORY 
Source: NAPLAN National Reports, 2008-12, http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html. 
16 
 
5. The impact of SEAM on educational outcomes: Regression analysis 
To further characterize SEAM's impact on participation and learning outcomes among the 
Indigenous population of the Northern Territory, we apply regression analysis to our data, using a 
difference-in-differences approach to estimate average annual effects of SEAM on participation rates 
and on the percentage of students above minimum standard. We assume that the entire Indigenous 
population of the Northern Territory was untreated in 2008, before implementation of SEAM; then 
fully treated in 2009 by the credible threat of having welfare payments withheld from parents who 
did not send their children to school; and then partially or ineffectively treated in subsequent years as 
the threat lost its credibility.15 The Indigenous populations of other states and territories are taken to 
be untreated in all years and grade levels, and both knowledge domains. 
We estimate each of our two equations over all eight states and territories in Australia, pooling all 
years and grade levels, and in both knowledge domains, thus taking Australia's other seven states and 
territories as our control group. As we showed in Section 3, the Indigenous population of the 
Northern Territory is different from that in other states and territories in other respects as well, not 
only in not being subject to SEAM. To test the robustness of our results to the choice of control 
group we first apply the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond 
and Hainmueller, 2010), which automatically constructs an artificial control from the other states and 
territories by weighting them based on pre-treatment covariates.16 Then we use placebo tests on all 
states and territories to construct a non-parametric test of the robustness of our results.   
5.1 The basic difference-in-differences specification 
For our basic difference-in-differences specification we pool the data over five years (2008-2012), 
four grade levels, two knowledge domains, and all eight states and territories, to estimate the 
following equation:  
(3)           2012 2012
3,5,7 2009 2009idgt r r g g t t NT t t NT idgtg t t
Y I I I I I I v                 
 
15 If the assumption that all Indigenous parents of truant Children in the NT were treated—i.e., all believed that their 
welfare payments would be reduced if they did not send their children to school—is an overstatement, then our estimated 
effects are biased downward. 
16 Computations are done in R with the “synth” package (Abadie, Diamond Hainmueller, 2011). 
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where  Yidgt is the outcome variable—the participation rate or share of the cohort above minimum 
standard—for the Indigenous population in state/territory i, in knowledge domain d (numeracy or 
reading) and grade g (3, 5, 7 or 9), in year t (between 2008 and 2012). Here, Ir is an indicator for the 
reading domain (numeracy is omitted) and r  is a fixed effect for reading; Ig is an indicator for grade 
level (grade 9 is omitted) and g  is a grade level effect; It is an indicator for year (2008 is omitted) 
and t is a year effect; INT is an indicator for the Northern Territory and  is the Northern Territory 
fixed effect; t is the difference-in-difference effect for year t; and vidgt  is an i.i.d. error term. Our 
interest focuses on t as it varies over time: it averages out the difference in the difference in the 
outcome between the base year and year t between the Northern Territory Indigenous population and 
the Indigenous populations in other states and territories, over all grade levels, knowledge domains 
and states and territories. We expect a large significant positive value in 2009, compared to 2008, the 
effect of the credible threat; and a subsequent decline, compared to 2009, when the threat proves 
hollow.17 The results of the two regressions—for participation and share above minimum standard—
are presented in Table 5. 
  
TABLE 5— INDIGENOUS OUTCOMES, POOLED DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS 
 Participation Above minimum standard 
 Coefficient Standard error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Intercept 0.791 0.009 0.644 0.016 
Northern Territory (NT) -0.211 0.018 -0.452 0.034 
Grade 3 0.123 0.007 0.146 0.014 
Grade 5 0.132 0.008 0.101 0.014 
Grade 7 0.101 0.007 0.110 0.014 
t=2009 -0.017 0.009 -0.022 0.016 
t=2010 -0.017 0.009 -0.014 0.016 
t=2011 -0.026 0.009 -0.011 0.016 
t=2012 -0.026 0.009 -0.026 0.017 
Reading 0.007 0.005 -0.022 0.010 
NT in 2009 0.196 0.025 0.099 0.048 
NT in 2010 0.101 0.024 0.054 0.046 
NT in 2011 0.115 0.024 0.077 0.048 
NT in 2012 0.085 0.025 0.042 0.047 
Note: Linear models fit by robust regression. Standard errors come from bootstrapping the regression models 
1999 times by fixed-x resampling. Estimates are approximately the same when the models are fit by OLS. 
 
Considering first the participation equation, in the left panel of Table 5, we find that the average 
participation rate of the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory in 2008 is a highly 
 
17 The key assumption here is that treatment is independent of the stochastic component. 
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significant 21.1 percentage points lower than the average rate for the Indigenous populations of other 
states and territories in grade 9, and 8-11 percentage points lower in the lower grades; there was no 
significant difference in participation rates between numeracy and reading; and participation rates in 
2008 were generally higher than in subsequent years by 1.7-2.6 percentage points.  
Our main quantities of interest in these equations are the difference in difference coefficients, t, 
estimating the time variation of Indigenous participation in the Northern Territory compared to the 
time variation of Indigenous outcomes in other states and territories. They appear in the shaded 
bottom four rows of Table 5. We find a highly significant effect of 19.6 percentage points in 2009, 
which then falls off by nearly half in 2010, rises slightly in 2011, and falls again in 2012, to a level 
8.5 percentage points above 2008 participation rates. Of these changes, the difference between 2009 
and subsequent years is statistically significant as are the differences between each year and 2008 (all 
for p-values of 0.001); however our estimates for 2010, 2011 and 2012 are not statistically different 
from each other.  
Turning now to the share of the Indigenous cohort above minimum standard, we find that in the 
base year, 2008, in grade 9 numeracy, the share above minimum standard in the Northern Territory is 
an alarming (and highly significant) 45 percentage points lower than the average share among the 
Indigenous populations in other states and territories. This difference is smaller in earlier grades, 
between 31 and 35 percentage points, but still extremely large; and larger in reading by a marginally 
significant 2.2 percentage points. Shares above minimum standard in 2008 were again higher by 1.1-
2.6 percentage points compared to subsequent years. Regarding our difference-in-differences 
coefficient—the difference over time in the difference between the share of Indigenous students 
above minimum standard in the Northern Territory and their share among the Indigenous populations 
of other states and territories—we find an effect of 9.9 percentage points in 2009 (significant for a p-
value of 0.02). Subsequent values remain positive, between 4.2 and 7.7 percentage points above the 
2008 share, but no other differences are statistically significant.  
5.2 Synthetic control estimates 
The appropriateness of the difference in differences approach rests on the assumption that absent 
any treatment the potential change over time in the outcome variable, after controlling for 
observables, should be the same for the control and treated groups. This assumption gains 
plausibility the more similar are the treatment and control groups prior to treatment. Our basic 
regression used the Indigenous population in all other states and territories as our control group, 
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though some are very different from the Northern Territory.18 A synthetic control is a weighted 
average of potential control units that best approximates the treated unit prior to treatment on 
relevant observable covariates, thus achieving greater similarity between treatment and control units 
(Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010). We used an automated method to construct our synthetic 
control for both regressions, based on the following pre-treatment covariates (all variables refer to 
2008 values):  
 
(i) Percentage of students participating in NAPLAN  
(ii) Percentage of participating students who scored above minimum standard  
(iii) Percentage of students in the cohort above minimum standard 
(iv) Average achievement in NAPLAN test  
 
We obtained, in this application, that the synthetic control for the Northern Territory is simply 
Western Australia.19 We therefore re-estimate the regressions in Table 5 over just two geographic 
units: the Northern Territory and the state of Western Australia, its synthetic control. The results are 
presented in Table 6. 
 
TABLE 6—REGRESSION ESTIMATES WITH WESTERN AUSTRALIA AS A SYNTHETIC CONTROL 
 Participation Above minimum standard 
 Coefficient Standard error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Intercept 0.711 0.006 0.494 0.015 
Northern Territory (NT) -0.133 0.007 -0.255 0.018 
Grade 3 0.126 0.004 0.112 0.011 
Grade 5 0.137 0.004 0.039 0.011 
Grade 7 0.113 0.004 0.103 0.011 
t=2009 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.018 
t=2010 0.019 0.007 0.020 0.018 
t=2011 -0.006 0.007 -0.034 0.018 
t=2012 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.018 
Reading 0.011 0.003 0.056 0.008 
NT in 2009 0.163 0.010 0.054 0.025 
NT in 2010 0.056 0.010 0.017 0.025 
NT in 2011 0.090 0.010 0.027 0.025 
NT in 2012 0.055 0.010 0.012 0.025 
Note: Linear models fit by robust regression. Standard errors come from bootstrapping the regression models 
1999 times by fixed-x resampling. Estimates are approximately the same when the models are fit by OLS. 
 
18 As an extreme example, where the share above minimum standard for Indigenous students in the Northern Territory is 
rarely above 40%, in the Australian Capital Territory, 80% of students score above minimum standard in many domain 
and grade level combinations.  
19 The program assigned a weight of 1 to Western Australia and a weight of 0 to all other states. 
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The effects we find here are similar but somewhat smaller. The rise in participation rates between 
2008 and 2009 is here 16.3 percentage points, still large but smaller than the estimate of 19.6 using 
all states as counterfactuals; the subsequent decline between 2009 to 2010 is slightly larger but still 
similar, 10.7 percentage points compared to 9.6; and the remaining difference in 2012, over the 2008 
base-year value is again smaller, 5.5 percentage points compared to 8.5. Making the same 
comparison for the share above minimum standard we find that the estimates using WA as the 
synthetic control yield smaller, though not statistically different, estimated coefficients. The 
difference in results between the two methods is the result of two effects. The first is, the greater 
similarity of the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory to the Indigenous population of 
Western Australia, which should reduce a possible bias arising from differences between the 
Indigenous population of the Northern Territory and less similar Indigenous populations in states and 
territories other than Western Australia. The second is the greater random variation associated with 
outcomes in a single state, which are averaged out when the full set of states is included in the 
regression. We cannot say how much of the difference should be attributed to each effect and treat 
the fairly narrow range between the two sets of estimates as setting upper and lower bounds on the 
actual treatment effect. 
5.3 Placebo tests 
To further test the robustness of our results, we construct a placebo test for the initial treatment 
effect. Placebo tests are widely used to show that an effect that has been identified is not spurious 
(DiNardo and Pischke 1997; Angrist and Krueger 1999; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). For each 
state and territory we construct a synthetic control and calculate the difference in difference in 
outcome variables between 2008 and 2009 within each grade-domain:  
 
 (4)               Zidg = (Yidg,2009  – Yidg,2008) – (Yc(i)dg,2009  – Yc(i)dg,2008) 
 
where Yidgt  is as before the outcome for state or territory i in knowledge domain d  and grade g; and 
c(i) is the synthetic control for state or territory i. We then compare the treatment effect across all 
states and territories. The results for participation rates in NAPLAN are presented in Table 7, and for 
the share achieving minimum standard in Table 8.  
Considering first the treatment effect on participation rates, in Table 7, we find that for both 
domains and across all grade levels, the highest values are in the Northern Territory with the 
exception of year 9 numeracy, where Queensland and Tasmania show stronger effects. The 
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probability of achieving a result "as good" as this from random permutations,20 (1/8)7(3/8), is less 
than 10-6. Averaging the treatment effects on participation for the Northern Territory across all grade 
levels and both knowledge domains we obtain a value of 17.6, slightly higher than the value obtained 
from the regression with the synthetic control.  
TABLE 7— PLACEBO TEST FOR THE TREATMENT EFFECT ON PARTICIPATION RATES 
 Numeracy Reading 
State/Territory Year 3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Year 3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 
Aust. Capital Territory 4.34 -0.22 -9.70 4.38 4.72 -3.13 -1.50 5.70 
New South Wales  3.90 3.58 4.62 4.35 7.33 3.77 4.89 5.49 
Queensland 4.02 3.61 4.93 12.22 1.98 6.23 6.06 12.52 
South Australia -14.30 -7.70 -5.31 -17.80 -12.97 -7.35 -7.40 -18.00 
Tasmania 11.46 5.63 -4.23 8.21 12.57 6.99 1.00 6.89 
Victoria 1.24 -0.22 6.18 -1.31 0.13 0.92 1.72 -3.11 
Western Australia -5.00 2.70 8.68 -4.10 -3.10 2.70 0.05 -3.25 
Northern Territory 15.10 15.30 30.50 14.10 16.30 17.20 25.70 6.80 
Notes: This table lists estimates for each state/territory using the synthetic control method. Each jurisdiction’s 
synthetic control is a weighted average of other jurisdictions; for the Northern Territory, a weight of 1 is 
assigned to Western Australia. The pre-SEAM covariates for each permutation are the participation rate in 2008, 
the proportion above minimum standard, the average test score and the pass rate in all years. Computations were 
done using the synth package in R (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2011). 
 
 
Table 8 presents treatment effects on the share achieving minimum standard. The result again 
indicates the presence of a significant treatment effect for the Northern Territory. The results are not 
as strong but still highly significant. The Northern Territory remains the only state or territory with a 
positive effect for all grade levels and both knowledge domains. Its effect is largest in grades 5 and 7 
numeracy and grade 7 reading; it has the second largest effect in grade 9 numeracy and grades 3 and 
5 reading; and the third largest effect in grade 3 numeracy and grade 9 reading. The probability of 
achieving a results as good as this from random permutations, (1/8)3 (2/8)3 (3/8)2, is less than 10-5. 
Averaging the treatment effects on share achieving minimum standard for the Northern Territory 
across all grade levels and both knowledge domains we obtain a value of 5.8, again slightly higher 
than the value obtained from the synthetic control regression.  
 
20
 The probability of ranking first in a random drawing from eight states/territories is 1/8; the probability of this 
happening seven times, assuming the draws are independent is (1/8)7; and the probability of ranking in the first three 
places is 3/8. 
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TABLE 8— PLACEBO TEST FOR THE TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE SHARE ACHIEVING MINIMUM STANDARD 
 Numeracy Reading 
State/Territory Year 3 Year 5 Year 3 Year 5 Year 3 Year 5 Year 3 Year 5 
Aust. Capital Territory 2.66 4.38 4.68 2.65 2.14 4.06 6.03 5.75 
New South Wales  10.76 1.27 5.67 9.30 12.17 3.62 2.12 -1.63 
Queensland -
17 96
-7.6 -4.88 -
12 50
-
12 53
-4.41 -3.85 -8.41 
South Australia -3.20 2.80 -8.60 -4.80 -1.10 -2.60 -1.50 -3.90 
Tasmania 3.90 5.75 5.05 -0.24 -1.13 9.01 4.42 1.51 
Victoria -3.20 3.00 6.80 -3.10 -0.90 3.50 7.00 -6.80 
Western Australia 4.10 6.80 6.80 4.30 5.50 4.40 10.10 4.60 
Northern Territory 4.75 0.59 -9.28 4.08 3.74 -6.77 -4.37 7.05 
Notes: This table lists estimates for each state/territory using the synthetic control method. Each jurisdiction’s 
synthetic control is a weighted average of other jurisdictions; for the Northern Territory, a weight of 1 is 
assigned to Western Australia. The pre-SEAM covariates for each permutation are the participation rate in 2008, 
the proportion above minimum standard, the average test score and the pass rate in all years. Computations were 
done using the synth package in R (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2011). 
 
 
Table 9 presents the different estimates obtained for the various treatment effects from the three 
methods used: difference-in-differences regressions using all states/territories as controls (columns 1 
and 4); difference-in-differences regressions using only Western Australia as the counterfactual 
(columns 2 and 5); and the average effect obtained from a disaggregated calculation of difference-in- 
differences effects between the Northern Territory and Western Australia, its synthetic control 
(columns 3 and 6). 
 
TABLE 9— COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES, % 
 Participation Above minimum standard 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Increase from 2008 to 2009 19.6 16.3 17.6 9.9 5.4 5.8 
Decline from 2009 to 2010 9.5 10.7  4.5 3.7  
Increase from 2008 to 2012 8.5 5.5  4.2 1.2  
Notes: The estimates in columns 3 and 6 are the average of all Northern Territory synthetic control estimates 
from row 8 in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. 
 
 
While these estimates vary across the different methods they present a similar pattern. The initial 
effect of SEAM, when the threat was perceived to be credible, was very large: participation rates 
rose in one year by 16-20 percentage points above an average base rate of 68%, then declined in one 
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year by about 10 percentage points, once it became clear that the threat was not carried out; and 
reached a participation rate 5 to 8 percentage points above pre-SEAM levels in 2012, the last year in 
our study. 
The initial effect of SEAM on the share of the cohort achieving minimum standard in the first year 
of implementation, when the threat was perceived to be credible, was also large: an increase of 
between 5 and 10 percentage points above an average base rate of 32%. This was followed by a large 
decline the following year of between 3 to 5 percentage points, and share levels in 2012 that were 1 
to 4 percentage points above pre-SEAM levels. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Australia's School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM), 
implemented in 2009 to raise school attendance rates among Indigenous children in the Northern 
Territory, and implemented against the backdrop of the Northern Territory Emergency Response 
(NTER), provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of a credible threat to link welfare 
payments to school attendance. The strong police and military presence that was part of the NTER, 
the temporary suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act, as well as the troubled history of race 
relations in Australia, all contributed to creating a climate in which the Indigenous community of the 
Northern Territory came to believe, mistakenly, that truancy would be universally punished by an 
immediate reduction in welfare payments. This led to a strong positive response, initially, 
dramatically increasing NAPLAN participation rates. However, as the harsh measures threatened by 
SEAM were not carried out in practice, and this became widely known, the threat evaporated and 
much, though not all of the gains dissipated. 
In this paper we estimated the strength of this response and its variation over time, using 
participation rates and test scores drawn from Australia's National Assessment Program—Language 
Arts and Numeracy (NAPLAN). Specifically, we estimated difference-in-differences regressions that 
compared the change in participation rates and test scores in reading and numeracy, in grades 3, 5, 7 
and 9, between 2008, the year before SEAM was implemented, and each year until 2012, between 
the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory and the Indigenous populations of Australia's 
other states and territories. We found that in 2009, the first year in which SEAM was implemented, 
test participation increased dramatically, on average between 16 and 20 percentage points above a 
pre-SEAM rate of 68%, beyond the average change in Australia’s other Indigenous populations. This 
rise in participation rates did not lower test means appreciably, suggesting that the academic ability 
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of those induced to sit the test by SEAM was similar, on average, to that of students who would have 
participated in NAPLAN absent SEAM. Consequently, the share of each cohort achieving minimum 
standard in each subject in that year increased substantially in 2009, by between five and ten 
percentage points over a pre-SEAM base rate of 32%, with no similar rise in other Indigenous 
populations. However, as the threat of withholding welfare payments was not actually carried out 
except in a handful of cases, and this was observed and became widely known, participation rates 
fell off substantially in the following year, and subsequent years saw most but not all of the gains 
evaporating. Participation rates in 2012, the last year in our study, remained significantly above pre-
SEAM participation rates but nearly all the gains in the share of the cohort achieving minimum 
standard had disappeared by then.  
These findings demonstrate that a credible threat to link welfare payments to school attendance 
can be highly effective, at least in the short run. At the same time they also demonstrate the difficulty 
of following through on such threats, even in the unique circumstances of SEAM, which leant them 
their initial credibility. Once the threat proved hollow, most of the initial gains were reversed, 
indicating that many of the parents coerced into sending their children to school by SEAM did not 
come to appreciate the value of schooling for their children through this experience. This suggests 
that even credible efforts to enforce compulsory schooling by linking welfare payments to school 
attendance, or other punitive action, will not be fully effective in the longer term unless they are 
accompanied by measures that increase parents’ and children’s appreciation of the value of 
schooling. 
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Appendix 
TABLE A1: GRADE 3 NUMERACY  
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.72 0.86 0.78 0.79 0.75 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.48 0.31 
Western Australia 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.64 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.54 
Queensland 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.73 0.70 0.77 0.81 0.69 
New South Wales 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.86 0.80 
Victoria 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.78 0.82 0.81 
South Australia 0.97 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.81 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.61 
Tasmania 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.83 
Australian Capital Territory 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.87 0.79 0.81 0.85 0.80 0.78 
 
TABLE A2: GRADE 3 READING 
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.71 0.89 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.22 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.32
Western Australia 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.49 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.56
Queensland 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.65 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.74
New South Wales 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.81
Victoria 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.82 0.81
South Australia 0.96 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.73 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.66
Tasmania 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.83
Australian Capital Territory 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.86 0.77 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.78
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TABLE A3: GRADE 5 NUMERACY 
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.72 0.90 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.28 0.42 0.32 0.38 0.28
Western Australia 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.52 0.60 0.55 0.57 0.53
Queensland 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.65
New South Wales 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.73 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.78
Victoria 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.79
South Australia 0.97 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.65 0.61
Tasmania 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.86 0.83
Australian Capital Territory 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.85 0.78
 
 
TABLE A4: GRADE 5 READING 
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.71 0.92 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.19 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 
Western Australia 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.44 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Queensland 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.62 
New South Wales 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.75 
Victoria 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.79 
South Australia 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.60 
Tasmania 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.83 0.76 0.81 0.82 0.79 
Australian Capital Territory 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.85 0.77 
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TABLE A5: GRADE 7 NUMERACY 
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.65 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.71 0.33 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.31 
Western Australia 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.84 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.61 
Queensland 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.73 
New South Wales 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.70 
Victoria 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 
South Australia 0.94 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.64 
Tasmania 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.74 0.83 0.76 0.81 
Australian Capital Territory 0.83 0.74 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.76 0.63 0.78 0.72 0.71 
 
 
TABLE A6: GRADE 7 READING 
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.63 0.87 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.21 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.30 
Western Australia 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.60 
Queensland 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.73 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.73 
New South Wales 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.76 
Victoria 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.79 
South Australia 0.96 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.70 0.65 0.70 0.71 0.69 
Tasmania 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.93 0.83 0.74 0.83 0.78 0.84 
Australian Capital Territory 0.81 0.79 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.77 0.69 0.78 0.76 0.73 
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TABLE A7: GRADE 9 NUMERACY 
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.61 0.75 0.64 0.68 0.65 0.29 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.31 
Western Australia 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.49 
Queensland 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.65 
New South Wales 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.77 0.64 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.62 
Victoria 0.79 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.75 0.67 0.68 0.62 0.58 0.66 
South Australia 0.89 0.70 0.65 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.52 0.51 
Tasmania 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.81 0.84 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.66 0.73 
Australian Capital Territory 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.61 0.66 0.67 0.62 0.69 
 
 
TABLE A8: GRADE 9 READING 
 % Participating in NAPLAN % Above minimum standard 
State/Territory 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Northern Territory 0.62 0.75 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.21 
Western Australia 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.42 
Queensland 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.63 0.57 0.59 0.63 0.59 
New South Wales 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.65 0.61 
Victoria 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.67 0.63 0.57 0.61 0.66 
South Australia 0.90 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.60 0.49 0.41 0.50 0.49 
Tasmania 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.68 
Australian Capital Territory 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.69 0.80 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.67 
 
